This paper covers the question if and how incentive schemes work evaluated by their impact on company performance (market capitalization and profit before tax). Based on a unique data set for German executive directors of DAX companies it can be proved that neither short (STI) nor long term incentives (LTI) plans necessarily support the company success. It rather depends on the efficiency of each plan, i. e. on its design. Special attention has to be paid on target setting. Short term focused objectives often miss their targets, whereas long term ori-ented objectives significantly support the company success. To solve the prisoner's dilemma between employers and employees by a quasiendless game, additional measures may be helpful, such as share ownership guidelines.
Introduction
That "people respond to incentives" (Levitt and Dubner, 2009b , p. XIV) is a common belief. This became even stronger with a negative association during the course of the financial crisis since 2008/09 as incentive schemes of banks are broadly considered as main reason for the crisis 1 . It is assumed that they incentivized risky and shorthand behavior. Was compensation, especially executive compensation, intensively discussed before it is now in the center of public and research interest (Larcker and Tavan, 2011) .
As a reaction on the crisis, numerous countries introduced new laws or regulations for executive pay and incentives, such as the five guiding principles for executive pay in 2009 or some parts of the DoddFrank Act of the US government in 2010 (N. U., 2009, and N. U., 2010).
The German government reacted with the introduction of the Gesetz zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung (VorstAG) (Law on the Appropriateness of Executive Compensation) for listed companies in 2009. One of the main intentions of the VorstAG is a sustainable incentivation of executive directors. The VorstAG requires -amongst others -that more than 50 % of the variable 1 As beginning of the last financial crisis is often the bankruptcy of investment bank Lehman Brothers in September 2008 mentioned. Bhagat and Bolton (2010) consider the incentives of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac that encouraged individuals to purchase residential real estate as the most important cause of the crisis.
remuneration has to be based on a performance period of more than one year. Generally, incentive plans can be distinguished in two types, short (STI) and long term incentives (LTI), with vesting periods of one (short) or more (long) years respectively as well various subtypes and potential plan parameters, especially for long term incentives. There exists already a great literature on incentive schemes, but there is no evidence how the different short and long term incentive plan types are composed and how their plan parameters exactly work. This is even more remarkable as such an analysis would be essential to derive both efficient incentive schemes and legal initiatives regulating incentives.
Referring to this research gap, this paper covers the question if and how incentive plans exactly work evaluated by their impact on company performance. It is split into five sections. Following this introduction, part two provides an overview on different incentive types and their parameters as well as a summary of the literature to this topic. Section three covers the theoretical background. The empirical analysis is shown under four. It is based on a unique data set for German executive directors of DAX companies (30 largest listed companies in Germany) with much information not shown in annual reports. Being Europe's largest economy, Germany is a good reference country as its developed compensation schemes have been affected by comprehensive regulatory changes in recent years. The conclusions of the evaluations are derived in section five.
Incentive Types

Incentives in the Context of Total Remuneration
Studies on compensation and incentives have a long history. Being one of the first, Masson already proved in 1971 a positive effect of US executive compensation on share performance. These results have been confirmed in many analyses (see Jensen and Zimmermann, 1985 , for an empirical overview) and for many countries besides the USA, e. g. for China (Firth et al., 2010) and Australia (Evans and Evans, 2002 ).
But to understand incentive plans correctly their role in a total remuneration context has to be considered. Core and Guay (2010) argue that contracts incorporating too much incentives and too little pay will lead to the effect that executives will either quit or will act conservatively in order to avoid firm risk. If the contract includes too much pay and too little incentives, the executives and the shareholders interests will not sufficiently be aligned.
Remuneration covers different components. As shown in table 1 it can be distinguished in base salary, incentives and benefits: 
Incentives
Benefits
• Fix cash pay component.
• Short Term Incentives: Annual incentives depending on the company and/or individual performance.
• Long Term Incentives: Incentives with a vesting period of two or more years depending on the company and/or individual performance , e.g. stock options and performance share plans.
• Various remuneration components, such as pensions, company cars, insurances, etc..
Focus of this document.
There is a trend from STI to base salary, with the portion of base pay increasing from 28 % to 32 % between 2006 and 2010 as well as the STI simultaneously decreasing from 46 % to 40 %. The LTI portion remains stable with 26 % in 2006 and 27 % in 2010.
Short Term Incentives
Looking at European and US blue chip companies, there are actually no companies that do not apply STI plans. But they differ in terms of their parameters. Table 2 shows the different STI plan targets of DAX companies in 2010. Profit related targets are the most prevalent and used for 27 times followed by individual (22) and return (18) targets. Therefore, return and, especially, profit are in the strategical focus of companies.
Long Term Incentives
Contrary to STI plans, LTI schemes are not applied by all companies and can be differentiated in various plan types. Figure 2 shows the different LTI plan types of DAX companies. The LTI category 'options' covers stock options as well as stock appreciation rights, 'performance cash' includes performance cash plans, 'performance shares' comprise performance shares (units), and 'restricted shares' cover restricted stocks (units). (Performance) Deferred STI plans could be allocated to options, performance cash, performance shares or restricted shares depending on their plan parameters. Therefore, they are mentioned as own category.
LTI are often share based with an unclear impact on company performance. Frye (2001) shows a positive link between equity-based compensation and company performance. This is contradicted by Morck et al. (1988) who argue that stock based incentives are too low to have an effect on executives and subsequently companies' performance. Bannier and Feess (2010) conclude that high-powered incentives reduce performance rather than improve it.
Especially, share options are discussed very controversially. Whereas Sesil et al. (2000) as well as Ittner et al. (2001) come to mixed conclusions regarding the impact of share options on company performance (see also Kole, 1996) , consider Murphy (2000a and 2000b ) stock options generally as inefficient remuneration vehicle.
Share ownership guidelines (SOG) are a special kind of LTI and considered separately. They define to which extent employees have to hold shares of their employer. Referring to many authors, company ownership (guidelines) by employees has a positive impact on firm performance (Benson et al., 2011). For instance, Morck et al. (1988) show that management ownership of 0 % to 5 % or above 25 %, increases the company value due to stronger incentives and decreases it at an ownership of 5 % to 25 % related to managerial entrenchment. McConnell and Servaes (1990) come to slightly different conclusion, saying that the company value increases until an equity ownership by managers of 40 % to 50 %. Figure 3 shows the different LTI plan categories and types per DAX company in 2010. Today, performance cash and restricted shares are dominating. Table 3 shows the LTI plan targets of DAX companies in 2010. Share price related targets -used for 22 times -are the most prevalent and another strategical company focus. 
Theoretical Approach
Following the optimal contracting theory, pay levels (For an evaluation of remuneration level determinants see Hinderlich (2012) ) and structures, like incentive schemes, are optimally contracted due to legal and economical constraints (Fama and Jensen, 1983, Frydman and Jenter, 2010 , as well as Thomas and Wells, 2010) . Therefore, an optimal contract should appropriately reflect the factors, such as incentive schemes, that have a positive impact on the company performance. But this assumption is contradicted by various theories.
Company Owner and Employee in a Prisoner's Dilemma
The fact that pay arrangements are not always optimal and may include ineffective components is reflected in the assumption that the relationship between company owner and employee is a prisoner's dilemma with two players -owner and employee -possessing complete and imperfect information (Güth, 1999, and Sieg, 2005 ) (see figure  6 ). The common wealth will be maximized by cooperation of both parties, i.e. that the employee fulfils the interests of the company owner and gets an appropriate compensation for his cooperation. But both sides can increase their own wealth by non cooperation if the other side cooperates. Thus, the management might introduce measures with a positive short term but a negative long term impact on the company success. Based on this short term success, the management will realize a high compensation and the long term consequences may be suffered by the succeeding management and the shareholders (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003) . The company owner may try to increase his own rent by paying the employee less than the agreed compensation.
Thus, the pay-out matrix is based on the following assumptions:
Independent of the strategy of the other side, both owner and employee realize a higher pay-out if they do not cooperate. These dominant strategies lead to a Nash equilibrium with the least preferable payout combination D/d (Gabisch, 2000) .
This prisoner's dilemma may be solved in an endless game if owner and employee can react with cooperation on cooperation and non cooperation on non cooperation of the other side. Due to the fact that employees will leave the company sooner or later, the contract between owner and employer has to end at a certain point. Thus, both sides will have an incentive not to cooperate in the last contract period and, in anticipation of this behavior, not to cooperate in the periods before (Demers and Wang, 2010).
Bargaining/Rent Seeking Power
These general assumptions may be diluted in dependence of the employee's (Bebchuk and Pointing into a similar direction as the bargaining power approach is Rosen's (1981) theory of superstars. Referring to Rosen, high remuneration does not necessarily compensate superior functions or a high marginal work product, i.e. for performance. It can rather be considered as tournament prize for the employee winning against internal and external competitors.
Depending on the company's or employee's power, the Nash Equilibrium is in these specific cases not at D/d and rather at B/b or C/c respectively. But it is very likely that neither a company nor an employee would stay long in a situation that is linked to an own disadvantage. Therefore, a deviation from the general Nash equilibrium D/d should only occur for a limited number of companies/employees in a restricted period of time.
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Evidence for the managerial power theory is option backdating and spring loading (Yermack, 1995) .
Principal Agent Theory
The theoretical basis of many research papers evaluating the link between company performance and executive pay is the principal agent theory covering the following assumptions (Jensen and Meckling, 1976 ): 3 -Incomplete contracts: Contracts cannot cover all issues that may arise after the signature of the contract (see also Coase, 1937 , and Milgrom and Roberts, 1992).
-Information asymmetries: Human beings only have incomplete information when they have to come to a decision.
-Opportunism: Human beings act in their own interests (see also Jensen and Meckling, 1994 ).
-Risk neutrality: Human beings possess different risk preferences.
A company owner (principal) has to act within this context and to ensure that an employee (agent) acts in the principal's and the company's best interest. To ensure a corresponding agent behavior, it is impossible for the principal to fix all duties of the agent in a contract. The principal furthermore does not have all relevant information on the agent's performance resulting in information asymmetries between both sides. This may lead to hidden action and moral hazard (Kräkel, 1999) . The principal furthermore has to take into account that the agent acts in his own interest and that different agents might make have different levels of risk aversion.
The principal has some instruments to solve or at least diminish this dilemma, such as improved control/information systems and institutions, incentives, company culture, etc.. Amongst these options incentives are considered as being the most efficient. Incentive schemes honor behavior that is in line with the principal interests and sanction behavior that is against the interests of the company owner.
The importance of right target setting is proved by various analyses. Rajagoplan (1996) shows that short term incentives with accounting targets increase the performance of companies with a defensive strategy, whereas long term incentives with market related performance targets improve the performance of companies with a prospector strategy. O'Connor and Rafferty (2010) show that return incentives decrease the shareholder value, whereas risk incentives foster it. Another theoretical approach is seniority pay (Lazear, 1979 (Lazear, , 1981 (Lazear, , and 1988 . It is not part of the analyses, as the considered data sample consists of executive directors of German blue chip DAX 30 companies with different pay structures than for other employees, often being equal amongst ordinary executive directors in one company. Furthermore, it is not obvious if the executive directors followed a seniority pay paths before becoming an executive board member.
Quasi-endless game
Even though the principal agent theory provides a solution how owners and employees may cooperate, it does not solve the problem of ending contracts and the accompanying constant attraction of non cooperation. This issue may be solved by contracts or laws leading to quasi-endless games. For instance, the employee could be obliged by contractual clawback clauses or by law to pay back its remuneration if misbehavior or under achievement of targets become obvious after the employee left the company. 4 The level of payback should depend on the level of misbehavior. Contracts and laws should furthermore ensure that opportunistic rent seeking of the company owner against the employee will be avoided and punished.
In Germany, only laws regulate to some extent that employees can be obliged to pay back remuneration if they act intentionally or grossly negligent against the interests of the company. Employees are to some extent protected against opportunistic rent seeking behavior of company owners by the regulations of their individual labor contracts and laws ensuring a minimum standard of compensation.
A further way of aligning the interests of company owner and employee might be to increase the investment of the employee in the company, e.g. via share ownership guidelines (Evans and Evans, 2002) . 5 Obligations to hold a specific stake in the company can be extended to the time after the employment contract ceased and, thus, diminish the potential danger of finite contracts Murphy, 1990a and 1990b) . Another option might be that the company can hold back pension or severance payments if misbehaviour or underachievement of targets becomes obvious after the executive left the company.
Hypotheses
Referring to the current literature, theories, and business developments, the following six hypotheses regarding the effectiveness and efficiency of incentive plans are evaluated in this paper.
H1: Incentive schemes support the company performance. (Effectiveness).
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In the course of today's economical crisis, clawback clauses are intensively discussed -especially for bonus payments -as instrument to ensure the sustainability of management decisions. In the USA, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act hasamongst others -introduced requirements that companies adopt clawback policies (Larcker and Tavan, 2011 Whereas the distinction between effectiveness and efficiency can be described as follows:
1. Effectiveness: Doing the right things. 2. Efficiency: Doing things right. Doing things in a way to achieve a target can be described as effectiveness. Doing things in an optimal output/input ratio can be considered as efficiency. Peter Drucker (1963) summarizes both terms as follows: "It is fundamentally the confusion between effectiveness and efficiency that stands between doing the right things and doing things right. There is surely nothing quite so useless as doing with great efficiency what should not be done at all."
The hypothesis above can be translated into a quantifiable model: 
Empirical Analysis
Description of Data
The analysis is based on a unique data sample of The data set incorporates individual information on the companies' executive directors such as compensation, function, age, gender, education, job experience, and membership in internal and external supervisory boards. The sample also covers comprehensive financial data of the DAX companies such as sales, profit, and personnel expenses. Furthermore, the sample includes information on the company environment, such as location, ownership structure, and industry sector. The data is collected from publicly available sources, i.e. from annual reports, 6 Referring to the VorstOG, listed companies can opt out from their obligation to disclose the executive directors' compensations individually if at least 75 % of shareholders approve this at the annual general meeting.
financial data provider finanzen.net, as well as officially released company information.
The sample population covers 305 executive directors who served in DAX companies between 2006 and 2010 and is restricted to executive directors who served full year. The final population covers 273 executive directors consisting of 42 CEO's, ten Deputy CEO's, and 221 Ordinary executive directors with various functions.
As approximation for the company success and, thus, as dependent variables serve profit before tax (natural logarithm) and market capitalization (natural logarithm). The relevance of these two measures is supported by the fact that -as shown above -the majority of DAX STI and LTI schemes apply profit and share price targets. To analyze the sustainability of incentive schemes, profit before tax and market capitalization of the current and the following three financial years are applied as dependent variables.
The Table 5 shows the independent variables and their assumed impact on company performance based on the theories above (Hinderlich (2007) shows that work councils and collective bargaining support company performance. As all DAX 30 companies are covered by similar co-determination systems, their impact can hardly be differentiated.). Both the STI (LN STI Portion) and LTI (LN LTI Portion) portion of total direct compensation are assumed to have a positive, decreasing impact on company performance. 7 Share ownership guidelines are considered to increase profit and market capitalization.
Descriptive Statistics
Tab. 4: Descriptive Statistics for Independent Variables
The existence of the different LTI types -share option (Options), performance cash (Performance Cash), performance share (Performance Shares), and restricted share plans (Restricted Shares) -is assumed to have a positive effect on the profit and market capitalization of companies (reference 7 As shown in table 4, all independent variables have 813 observations except LN STI Portion (758) and LN LTI Portion (671). This is due to the fact that the total direct compensation portion of STI and LTI are in 55 and 142 cases respectively 0 % and not considered after logarithm them.
category: No LTI). If a company has more than one LTI plan, the primary LTI with the largest compensation portion is considered to capture the main LTI effect.
The fact that a company has share (Share Target STI and Share Target LTI) or profit (Profit Target STI and Profit Target LTI) related performance targets in its STI or (primary) LTI plan is assumed to have a positive impact on the companies profit and market capitalization. 8 The LTI vesting period -two (Vesting2), three (Vesting3, reference category), four (Vesting4), and five (Vesting5) years -impact is not clear. The impact of absolute, i.e. company linked, and relative, i.e. peer related, LTI targets has been also tested without clear results, but leading to multicollinearity. A new CEO (New CEO) is likely to provide the company with new, performance fostering impulses, whereas it is not obvious if it is an advantage to hire executive directors externally (External Hire) or internally (Internal Hire).
Education of executive directors is distinguished in three categories, with the company performance likely to be positively related to the educational level: Highest degree is apprenticeship (Apprentice) (reference category), highest degree is university degree (Study), and highest educational degree is phd/post doc (Phd).
Job tenure and age are measured by the executive director's tenure in current function (Tenure) and its square term (QTenure) as well as three age categories (Age54, Age55, and Age60), i. e. executive directors who are younger than 55 and quite far away from retirement (Age54) (reference category), the ones between 55 and 59 who are nearer to retirement (Age55), and executive directors with 60 years or more being very near to retirement (Age60). It is reasonable to assume that firm success is positively influenced by service periods and age, whereas it is also likely that these effects may change after certain periods, especially, when executive directors are getting nearer to retirement. . 10 Referring to the theories above, being a manager superstar is not necessarily linked to a superior company performance.
As variables for company size serve the natural logarithm of number of employees (LN EE) with the assumed positive decreasing effect on profit and market capitalization. Business sector is distinguished in financial services (FS) (reference category) and non-financial services (Non FS) with an unclear effect of its impact on company success. 11 show that growth companies apply longer vesting periods as they have a stronger focus on the companies' horizon. Firms grant options with shorter vesting periods to more powerful executives, and when institutional ownership is low. There is evidence that companies apply longer vesting periods to retain CEOs. 10 Monthly published Manager Magazin is one of the most influential business magazines in Germany. Manager Magazin's Börsenbarometer is a monthly survey with 500 leading managers participating. One question in this survey asks the participants in which managers they have confidence to sustainably increase the share price resulting in a top 20 manager ranking for listed companies in Germany. With a ten year Fortune 500 sample, Fanelli et al. (2004) show that charismatic CEO influence their compensation and share price, whereas their impact on other company indicators seems rather negligible. 11 The models in this paper were also calculated by using dummy variables for all business sectors of the 30 DAX companies, e.g. automotive or aviation, leading to similar Company ownership is clustered in four categories: Many shareholders (Many) (reference category), largest owner is governmental (Government), largest owner is non-governmental (Private), and majority owner (Major). This takes the heterogeneity and nature of ownership into account, 12 with arguments for and against each ownership structure. 13 The estimates also include time and location dummies. The time dummies cover the considered years from 2006 to 2010 (reference category). Neither profit nor market capitalization have to be higher or lower in subsequent years. The location dummies refer to the German federal states in which the companies are headquartered, i.e. Bavaria (reference category), Baden-Wuerttemberg, Hesse, Hamburg, Lower Saxony, North Rhine-Westphalia, and Rhineland-Palatinate. It seems reasonable to assume that companies in the more economically developed south of Germany are generally more successful, especially, in the reference state Bavaria. But it is likely that this trend is not consistent at the considered level of German blue chip companies.
Results
The empirical results for hypotheses one to four and six are shown in tables 6 and 7. Hypothesis five is evaluated in table 8.
results as shown below. But the differentiation between FS and Non FS proved to be the most meaningful. 12 There exist various approaches in the literature to categorize ownership. Whereas De Angelis and Grinstein (2010) argue that shareholder portions above 5 % can be considered as large, this paper refers to Voulgaris et al. (2009) , categorizing large ownership as being at least 10 %. An additional cluster is applied for majority -often family -owners with a share portion of at least 40 %. 13 For instance, Bandiera et al.(2010) find empirical evidence that family owned Italian companies apply less performance sensitive contracts for their managers. This attracts less talented and risk averse managers, working and earning less than their peers. Also for Italian family owned companies, Barontini and Bozzi (2010) show that excess CEO compensation is linked to worse stock and accounting performance, but that this result is only significant at a lower degree of ownership concentration, a higher link between voting and cash flow rights and in the absence of shareholders' agreements. Thus, the conflict is rather between family and minority owners and not between shareholders and managers. The pay for performance relation in Chinese companies is significantly reduced by state ownership (Kato and Long, 2005) . De Angelis and Grinstein (2010) prove that performance is better in complex companies with a concentrated shareholder ownership. White (1980) tests indicate heteroscedasticity, the standards errors are robust (see also Huber, 1967 ). *, **, ** refer to a significance level of 10 %, 5 %, and 1 %. White (1980) tests indicate heteroscedasticity, the standards errors are robust (see also Huber, 1967 ). *, **, ** refer to a significance level of 10 %, 5 %, and 1 %. White (1980) tests indicate heteroscedasticity, the standards errors are robust (see also Huber, 1967 ). *, **, ** refer to a significance level of 10 %, 5 %, and 1 %. 
H4: There exist differences between the effects of LTI vesting periods on company performance
A three year LTI vesting period (Vesting3) (reference) is performance fostering compared to a four (Vesting 4) (0.0987 to -0.3202 and -0.1685 to -0.2805) and five (Vesting 5) (-0.4804 to -0.4407 and -0.2055 to -0.6402) year period, whereas compared to -seldom -two years (Vesting 2) (0.1062 to -0.7052 and 0.2434 to 0.0899) three years are only preferable for profit (tables 5 and 6). Therefore, the effect of vesting periods is becoming negative after some years.
H6: Contractual and legal measures ensure quasi-endless games
Share ownership guidelines (SOG) (0.1624 to 0.4434 and 0.0746 to 0.1774) seem to sustainably foster the company performance, at least regarding profit (tables 5 and 6). The extension of the 'employer-employee game' is an approach to foster the company performance.
Further Determinants
A new CEO (NEW CEO) sustainably increases companies' profit and market capitalization, whereas the fact if an executive director is hired internally (Internal Hire), the education level (Study and Phd), job tenure (Tenure and QTenure), executive directors age (Age55 and Age60), and superstardom (Superstar) do not have a significant effect.
The company success is determined by its size (LN EE) and business sector (Non FS). Larger and financial services companies have significantly better company performance. Furthermore, many owners (Many) (reference) have a positive impact on market capitalization and profit compared to governmentally (Government) and majority owner (Major) dominated companies as well as on the market capitalization of privately (Private) owned firms.
There is a no clear time, but a significant location effect supporting the hypothesis that companies in the economically more developed south of Germany are more successful (tables 5 and 6).
H5: Some incentives have been more efficient in the financial crisis than others
The sample is restricted to market capitalization in 2009 as dependent variable and the two and three periods before for the independent variables. The results for profit as dependent variable and for independent regressors from 2008 and 2009 are statistically not stable and, amongst others, suffer from too many omitted variable. As performance and restricted share plans as well as share related STI targets are not sufficiently applied in all years, their regression factors are sometimes omitted in the shown analyses. When only the market capitalization in the financial crisis of 2009 and the impact of the dependent variables two and three years before are considered, the results from above basically remain the same with some exceptions. Thus, the impact of share ownership guidelines becomes insignificant (-0.0046 and -0.0071) (see table 8).
Conclusions
Neither STI nor LTI plans necessarily support the company success. That incentive schemes even include some risks became obvious during the course of the financial crisis 2008/09. As shown in various studies, compensation, especially high risk incentives, had a negative impact on bank performance finally causing the financial crisis (Suntheim, 2010 , van Bekkum, 2010 , as well as Bolton, 2010 and 2011) .
Therefore, the question on the effectiveness of incentive schemes cannot be affirmed, it rather depends on the efficiency of each plan, i.e. on the way how it is designed. This is mainly due to the fact that there is no one fits all approach for incentive schemes as their impact depends on companies and employees characteristics, especially, on the level of individual risk aversion (Eaton and Rosen, 1983 , Abowd and Kaplan, 1999 , Core et al., 2002 , as well as Grund and Sliwka, 2006) . Therefore, the often raised claims for general regulations on executive pay and incentive schemes have to be treated with caution.
Special attention has to be paid on target setting. Short term focused objectives of STI plans often miss their targets, whereas long term oriented objectives of LTIs significantly support the company success. Targets of incentive schemes have to consider specific employee and company characteristics. Many companies focus too much on observable, financial performance targets at the expense of non financial targets, such as innovation as well customer and employee satisfaction (Ariely, 2010 , and Larcker and Tavan, 2011).
The full process has to be accompanied by performance management. Targets do not only have to be set properly, they also have to be communicated clearly and followed up regularly by reviews (see also Grund and Sliwka, 2007) . Overand underachievement has to be honored and sanctioned (monetarily). The positive effect of appropriate incentive schemes might further increase on a mid and long term basis as they serve as signaling for high-ability workers (Lazear, 1996 , Paarsch and Shearer, 2006 , Ferrall and Shearer, 1999 , as well as Lazear, 2003) .
To foster the incentivation and to solve the prisoner's dilemma by a quasi-endless game, additional measures may be helpful (see also Bebchuk and Fried, 2009 ). Share ownership guidelines seem to extend the 'game' between employer and employees in a performance fostering way.
